Keynote Conversation: Curtis L. Carter Art and Social Change Lecture with
Elizabeth Hinton and Christian Viveros-Fauné
*This transcript excerpt has been edited for length and clarity. A recording of the full
presentation is available on YouTube.
Christian Viveros-Fauné (CVF): The dimensions of the issue that we're going to talk
about during the next few days are as local as they are national and even international in
their scope. It's no secret, of course, that the U.S. has the highest number of incarcerated
persons and the highest rate of incarceration in the world. Year after year, the U.S. beats
out countries with much larger populations—India and China, for example—and even
more draconian systems of justice—Russian and the Philippines—for the distinction of
having the largest number of its own residents in jail. According to a 2018 report from
the Bureau of Justice Statistics, American prisons held nearly 2.2 million adults in 2016.
In other words, for every 100,000 people, 655 of them are behind bars. 1 If America's
[prison] population were a city, it would be the fifth largest in the country. Another
shocking way of thinking about America's prison population: more people are behind
bars in America than live in major cities such as Philadelphia or Dallas, and frankly way
more than live in Milwaukee. Today Elizabeth can speak expertly to how the land of the
free essentially became the land of prisons, and, of course, she has done that brilliantly in
her 2016 book, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass
Incarceration in America. But I also think it's important to address the local dimension of
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the problem.
The state of Wisconsin is the nation's leader in one key aspect of prison growth. Put
simply, it locks up African American men in record numbers. In the plain phrasing of one
journalist, "Wisconsin has become the home of black incarceration." 2 According to a
study that I think is cited in some of the literature the symposium has produced, the
prison population of Wisconsin has more than tripled since 1990. 3 That exponential
increase was fueled by a number of the things that Elizabeth points out in her book—
among them increased government funding for drug enforcement rather than treatment,
prison construction, three-strikes rules, mandatory minimum sentencing along with socalled truth in sentencing, replacing judicial discretion, concentrated policing in minority
communities, and state incarceration for minor probation and supervision violations. The
2010 census shows that Wisconsin has the highest rate of black male incarceration in the
nation. In Milwaukee County, over half of African American men in their thirties have
served time in state prison. That's nearly double the rate of incarceration for black men in
other states of the union. 4
In 2010, that rate of incarceration was 12.8 [percent] compared to 6.7 as a national
average. By contrast—and this is telling—only 1.2 percent of white men were
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incarcerated that same year. If one digs deeper, the statistics get even more depressing. A
whopping 4042 of every 100,000 black Wisconsin residents were incarcerated in 2010.
To quote the publication CityLab, those numbers are more than one and a half times
higher than even liberal estimates of the incarceration rate in the Soviet gulags at the end
of Stalin's reign. Let that rattle around a little bit. It's frightening! That's absolutely
frightening. In many ways, this is an invisible problem because it's kept invisible to us,
right? So, one of the things that we can do at a symposium like this is to bring it out into
the public. open the windows, open the doors. Let the sunlight in. How did we get here?
How did this happen?
Elizabeth Hinton (EH): My research is based on a decade of scouring every single
document I could get my hands on in the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and
Reagan archives—to really look at the set of decisions that policy makers made that led
to mass incarceration. This is the first historical study of national crime-control policy,
and until recently, I think many of us saw mass incarceration as the natural product of the
fact that certain people were committing more crimes. What I do, as a historian, is to
show that it's the outcome of a set of very calculated decisions. The first thing that I
discovered after weighing all of these documents is that mass incarceration was not—the
kind of law and order politics was not—this kind of electoral tool. We're seeing it come
up very much now, and Donald Trump has definitely reinvigorated that discourse. But
that it is built into our political, economic, and social systems, and that began to coalesce
during the 1960s at the height of progressive social change and the civil rights revolution.
In fact, crime control is really the only domestic policy issue of the late twentieth century

that conservatives and liberals agree on. So I'm trying to move us to see the ways in
which our turn to policing prisons and surveillance is a thoroughly bipartisan systemic
project. To point us towards a more robust understanding of liberalism, to come to terms
with the racist assumptions behind many liberal social policies. One of the things that
took me a while to grapple with in the book was really the limitations of Johnson's War
on Poverty and his Great Society and his equal commitment to both this punitive
intervention—the War on Crime—and social programs in the kind of intervention that
federal policy makers began to make in low-income black and brown communities.
Johnson and Kennedy were very committed to addressing the problem of racial
discrimination, but their view of black poverty was rooted in and influenced by social
scientists like Daniel Patrick Moynihan—and one of the pictures here is of Johnson doing
a paraphrase of Moynihan's report on the Negro family before the graduating class of
Howard University in June 1965. The Moynihan Report had been recently released, and
it basically argued that black poverty was not the result of socioeconomic exclusion—
centuries of marginalization and segregation—but that it was the result of black
pathological choices, a tangle of pathology and behavior stemming from slavery that led
to single-parent households and this pathology that bred poverty and crime. So the view
of federal policy makers—and this is, of course, based on their own set of racist
assumptions about people of color and black people in particular—the view of poverty as
a pathological problem prevented Johnson and like-minded liberal policy makers from
being able to commit the resources to a major structural intervention. Even by the end of
the Johnson administration, the Kerner Commission, after weighing the impact of urban

unrest in cities like Milwaukee and Detroit and Los Angeles and Newark, [concluded]
that we needed a real Marshall Plan to invest in American cities. That was not the
investment that ended up happening. The lasting investment was turned towards
militarizing urban police forces, modernizing and expanding the prison system, and
increasing surveillance in targeted low-income communities.
The other main thrust of the argument in the book is that before we get high rates of
violent crime in certain communities, before the rates of drug arrests come to certain lowincome areas, policy makers essentially decided that generations of black youth, who
they believed to be responsible for the unrest in Milwaukee and other cities in the late
'60s, were criminal. They began to throw around this term called "potential delinquent,"
and so they based their policies on these—the policies themselves were preemptive. They
were meant to stop crime before it occurred by encouraging police to saturate themselves
in communities, encouraging police to take on new kinds of roles in targeted low-income
urban communities, and it created a self-fulfilling prophecy, much of it fueled by
statistics in domestic urban policy. Basically, these policy makers indicted black and
brown youth based on the socioeconomic conditions of their lives instead of their actual
crimes. And these choices are part of what helps us understand how Milwaukee came to
be the largest incarcerator of black men in the country.
CVF: So what happened to the Marshall Plan part of all this? What happened to the job
growth? What happened to the —I don't know—even the recreational facilities? What
happened to better housing? Improvement of infrastructure? What happened to all of
that?

EH: I think throughout U.S. history there's been a real unwillingness on the part of policy
makers to really dedicate the resources necessary to disrupt the racial hierarchies that
have defined the United States historically. This is a pattern that we see in U.S. history
immediately after Emancipation, right? There's this new terrain of freedom. The contours
of citizenship expand. Suddenly four million people who had been in bondage are
ostensibly free, and immediately after Emancipation, we get new laws. We get the
criminalization of blackness for the first time. We get new laws in the form of black
codes where basically if you're a black person in the Southern states and you're not
working for a white owner, you can be arrested for vagrancy and placed in the convict
lease system. We get the first smaller—much smaller—scale of mass incarceration right
after Emancipation and then one hundred years later right after the Civil Rights Act and
the Voting Rights Act. In fact, the week before Johnson sends the Voting Rights Act to
Congress, he declares the War on Crime, so it's this "carrot and stick" approach to
domestic policy. We get a new domain and form of criminalization and confinement after
the contours of citizenship expand. So I think that we have decided to respond to the kind
of root problems of unemployment, poor housing conditions, failing schools, failing
urban public schools with policing, surveillance, and incarceration. We've decided to
manage the problem and also manage the problem of deindustrialization, the decline of
domestic manufacturing, with the prison industry, the security industry, the lawenforcement industry. And that's the choice that policy makers have made and that we've
all made as voters and as taxpayers. Wisconsin spends more money on imprisoning
young people than on educating young people. This seems to make no sense in a
democracy. Or maybe it does make perfect sense. I don't know—maybe that's the design.

CVF: Well that would seem to be the design. When was the turning point for this system
to become, sort of, self-perpetuated?
EH: That's a very difficult question. Basically, when Nixon takes office, he calls on his
attorney general, John Mitchell, and Norman Carlson, who was the director of the Bureau
of Prisons, to design a ten-year long-range master plan to modernize the American prison
system and expand the American prison system and create new maximum security
prisons for people who they—who policy makers—anticipated would be serving longer
and longer sentences. Of course, this is when the demographics of the American prison
system begin to change in the mid-1970s from majority white to majority black and
Latino. This is in the ten years after Johnson calls the War on Crime and transforms
policing. The crazy thing about this is that, within the document—and some of the charts
in the document are in my book—in 1970, policy makers and authorities begin to start
projecting for prison populations based on population projections for black youth
between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four. And also based on unemployment figures.
So the Congressional Research Service does all this work on unemployment, and instead
of job creation—instead of dealing with the problem of unemployment—they use
unemployment figures to determine how many prison beds will need to be built and be
filled. And this seems like a really misguided sense of priority. So they start building
prisons, and if you build prisons and project for prison populations and assume that
certain citizens are latently criminal, if you build these things, they will come. If you
build it, they will come.

CVF: Right, right. The term "social pathology" shows up quite a bit from the very
beginning of your book to the end. What is this social pathology that tens if not hundreds
of academics serving different administrations were basically talking about and
entertaining?
EH: For me it's a denial of history, and it's again based on these racist assumptions that
have really been a disease or a stain in the United States historically. Tropes and
stereotypes that don't take into account and grapple with the legacies and impact of
slavery, the legacies and impact of things like the convict lease system, the sharecropping
system in southern states, Jim Crow segregation; that don't take into account the
affirmative action programs for whites, as we call them, the way that the GI Bill
facilitated the white middle class, the way that housing projects were built for returning
GIs that white families and European ethnic families moved into for a couple years and
then moved to the suburbs, and that somehow families of color became trapped in for
generations. These are things that we don't talk about that get obscured. And it's a
problem of how we view mass incarceration, too, right? When we don't understand that
mass incarceration was a process. That criminalization is a process, and that it's the
outcome of how people decide to respond to certain social problems. We really blind
ourselves to the larger underlying root causes, and until we begin to grapple with those
root causes—and if we're going to really begin to deal with racism in this country, then a
lot of it is reckoning with our history, dealing with slavery in new ways, dealing with
what Jim Crow segregation looks like, dealing with racial terror, dealing with lynching.
Until we begin to have these conversations, we're going to continue to be blinded to the

keys to a more transformative and equitable future. But let me ask you a question on that
note.
I'm a historian and I can show certain things through the book. I spend time in
presidential archives and scour these documents so I can interpret and show the debates
and the sets of decisions, the memos that went back and forth. I can't capture some of the
things in the book that art can. So, what are the things that you think make art unique as a
genre and able to capture some of the more troubling aspects of society and push for
political and social change?
CVF: I think freedom, frankly. I think what art and artists can do, and institutions as
well, is to turn their attention to rethinking an issue, whatever the issue happens to be.
EH: Part of the story that the book tells is the simultaneous disinvestment from social
welfare programs and investment in crime control programs, right? And so we're really at
the point now where we're having to get creative about how to address social problems,
about how to ameliorate inequality.
I think one of the really exciting things about this gathering and others and the ways in
which art and performance can be a really key vehicle for change and transformation is
that, you know, we're all implicated in this mess in one way or another, and it's going to
take all of us to get out of it. Now, in my work, in my research, I look at the federal role,
and I think that we need different sets of policies, but we're also going to all have to work
together and transform institutions and push institutions to become involved in actively
making the kind of society that I think—that I hope—at least all of us in this room would

like to see. Having these kinds of conversations and thinking about new ways that we can
come together and begin to think about using resources differently are really key in this
moment.
CVF: Speaking of rethinking things from the ground up, I think that's substantially part
of what you've really done with this new history.
Your history is more complex in the sense that we're all implicated, as you said, right?
EH: It's a lot easier to have a bogeyman—a bad guy—and have it be, "Well, oh, this is
Republican politics; it's Ronald Reagan." The seeds of this were planted in the last
promising moment of our history when, for this brief moment, equality was the essential
guiding force of domestic policy, and it's what many called the Second Reconstruction. It
was an attempt to fulfill the unfinished legacy of slavery, and instead we get this massive
prison system and racialized mass incarceration.
CVF: There's the total attack on youth delinquency, right?
That's Kennedy. Going all the way back to Kennedy there's the idea of youth—and we're
talking children here. One of the striking things about what you write about in the book is
that initially they're delinquents. They're not twenty-to-thirty-year-olds, you know? We're
talking youth, right?
Children. So "social dynamite"—that's another term that's batted around. Clearly, then we
have the War on Poverty, the War on Crime, and finally—not least of all—the War on
Drugs.

EH: Johnson actually recast Kennedy's total attack on delinquency, which was an
experimental program. You know, the Kennedy administration was concerned about the
kind of demographic changes in U.S. society in Milwaukee and other places where black
people were coming into a third of populations in some cities in the '50s and '60s. And
this is part of where Moynihan came in. The Kennedy administration foresaw that if there
wasn't some kind of federal intervention—in the context of unemployment and
deindustrialization—to provide opportunities for this growing group of urban black
youth, they would explode. So they began referring to urban black youth as social
dynamite, and this is in '61, right? But in the absence of a major structural commitment to
dealing with the root causes of many of the problems that many of these youth were
facing, we do end up getting police increasingly used as, kind of, a Band-Aid in various
other forms of surveillance. That social dynamite does explode for the second half of the
1960s. During every summer of Johnson's presidency, more than 250 incidents of unrest
across the country.
The first major incident happens in Harlem in 1964, and the National Guard that same
summer, a few days later. Of course, all of these incidents, just like today, are a response
to various acts of police brutality; so police in Harlem in '64 kill a fifteen-year-old
unarmed black man, and it leads to several days of unrest. In March of 1965, in
anticipation of another long, hot summer, as they recall, Johnson declares the War on
Crime and begins to essentially get riot prevention equipment and surplus weapons from
Vietnam, so it's the beginning of the militarization of the police department. For Johnson,
the War on Poverty and the War on Crime are these action-oriented metaphors. But in

reality, when we look at the new mode of policing that the federal government began to
support, the investments that it began to make in police and prisons and court systems in
the U.S., we see that this leads to real gun battles, real victims, and real wars in American
cities, and they’re very targeted wars on low-income communities of color, even though,
on the surface, all of this language is seen as race neutral.
CVF: This phrase that I think you included in the book several times—"criminalization
of urban space"—what is that? Describe that. How does that work? Because I'm thinking
also about its cultural manifestations, right? And obviously, how tremendously heavy
those are.
EH: Right. It's a process that happens, beginning when, in the '60s, we get these new
federal interventions in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, deciding that there's a
role for the federal government in these spaces, and there should be a new role for police
in these spaces, again, to prevent the social dynamite from exploding. So we begin to see,
first, the influx of police, and then—even during the Johnson administration—we begin
to see that investment in housing in model cities and certainly in the community action
programs that had steered the early War on Poverty increasingly comes under police
departments. Actually, by the early 1970s, some of the youth employment programs that
the Office of Economic Opportunity had supported are now under the purview of the
Department of Justice.
So, part of it is that we begin to see that social programs in many communities are
increasingly run and administered by law enforcement. Where that happens—and this
goes to what we were talking about a little bit earlier—but in many communities today,

police and law enforcement are really the last public institutions standing. It's an influx of
police officers and new roles for law enforcement. You begin to see police officers being
expected to take on greater roles in community life. You begin to see police officers on
school grounds, taking on new roles in the everyday lives and criminalizing ordinary
everyday activity. A really close friend of mine grew up in South-Central Los Angeles.
And in 1974 he was playing on the playground at his school on a Saturday afternoon,
which is what kids do—kids play when they're not in school; they like playing on
playgrounds. Seven years old, and a police officer came up to him and put him in the
back of his police car and arrested him for trespassing at his own school. Now this would
never happen in a middle-class community, in a white community, in a suburban
community, but if you're a kid growing up in South-Central and you're at your school on
Saturday, you're a potential criminal, and you're trespassing. And what my friend thought
when he was in the back of that vehicle, and he told me this from prison decades later, is
that, "Well, if you're going to arrest me for no reason, I'll give you a reason to arrest me
next time." Criminalizing space creates an inevitability or limits the opportunities for
what people can see as their future and their possibilities, so it's a way in which ordinary
everyday life changes. The way that many communities come to feel like they're being
occupied. Not just by police officers in their physical sense, but in the kind of
surveillance technologies that are increasingly in communities.
I talked earlier about how, in the Johnson administration, policy makers saw community
behavior as the root cause of black poverty. By the Carter administration, the ideas of the
day are that crime itself is the root cause of poverty. And so, one of the things that Carter

does is begin to fortify housing projects, begin to create new bars, more metal locks for
residents, security cameras, fencing around the housing projects in Chicago and
Milwaukee and Detroit. This is one of the major thrusts of his urban policy—his social
programs. And one of the devastating things about this is that—and this is in '78, '79—he
also, in fortifying housing projects, creates an employment program for young residents
in the housing projects, right? So, these young people who are involved in installing the
security equipment and working with police to patrol other residents then become
involved in their own surveillance and the criminalization of themselves and their
families. In some sense, it's the impact of living in a space that's occupied; in many
senses, it's the impact of having police be a part of your everyday life and your
interactions, and it's also the physical aspects of what some communities look like—the
fact that some schools resemble prisons, the fact that some housing projects resemble
prisons. This sense of inevitability and, I think, missed opportunity that comes with that
process of criminalization.
CVF: So, if it's baked in, what do we do? Where do we go from there?
EH: Part of it is beginning to have these conversations, beginning to spread awareness,
reckoning with our history, reckoning with the legacies of slavery. We're not going to be
able to overcome the history of racism in our society until we begin to deal with it and its
root in slavery and the century of racial terror and the racial terror that we're still living
with that resulted from that. I think one of the things that Bryan Stevenson with the Equal
Justice Initiative has been doing in his work is to try to have us reckon with and
memorialize slavery, memorialize lynchings, so that they’re something that people have

to confront. Stevenson says that nobody should be able to visit certain places in the
American South without being confronted with the role that slavery played in building up
that place. So I think part of it is beginning to have those discussions, and the other part,
of course, is what we can do to begin to put pressure on others and within ourselves to
transform our communities. Actually taking action to think about, "Okay, well, if the
policy isn't there yet, what can I do to help build a vibrant, equitable, and socially just
community?" Who we vote for matters, and the kinds of organizing that we're committed
to also matter. It's going to take decades of that organizing of which art, of which history,
I think, is a part. The civil rights movement didn't just happen out of nowhere. It was, you
know, the outgrowth of a lot of careful political education and organizing on the ground.
CVF: But, speaking of that careful political education, what specific policy is proposed?
Because many of us are not experts on this, right? What should we be asking for? What
should we be organizing?
EH: First, as we begin to think about how to repair from a mass-incarceration society, we
really need to begin to look at reentry programs. So, we need to begin to think about how
to actually give people first chances and second chances, and—you'll hear about one of
the, I think, finest higher-education-in-prison programs in the country in San Quentin—of
beginning to give people tools while they're incarcerated to be able to have a second
chance and reconnect with their families and live a vibrant life when they're released. So I
think one of the things where we can actually begin to make an impact immediately is in
supporting people when they return home. That's extremely important.
You know, police are the gateway to the criminal justice system. In many communities,

they're the first contact or they're the contact that poor people have with the state, and so
we really need to begin to change our policing practices, and we need to begin to
empower citizens to have a role in the policing of their own communities. I'm very
critical of the Johnson administration, but I also celebrate Johnson for some of the
foresights of the War on Poverty, and one of the things that I think is important for us,
and should be important for us moving forward, is this precedent that's introduced, which
is maximum feasible participation. In the early War on Poverty, federal policy makers
were actually giving money to local organizations and saying, "You know what? We
can't really have outsiders coming in and solving the problem of poverty. You know best
what your community needs." And I think, again, due to policy makers’ own racism,
there's been a real limitation or pushback to actually thinking that people of color and
poor people can know best how to make their community vibrant, which is completely
ridiculous. So I think we need to begin to reinvest in communities and allow communities
to transform themselves instead of having outside people coming in, which is related.
And, of course, we need to roll back our overly punitive, draconian sentencing system in
this country where we punish people harshly for very, very long times. If we end the War
on Drugs, mass incarceration will not end. If we decarcerated every single person who
was in prison for nonviolent drug offenses, we would still be home to the largest prison
system in the world. It's not just about the War on Drugs, it's about the way we punish
and how we systematically round people up. So this effort, again, is going to take all of
us. It's going to take the federal government, it's going to take federal, local, state
governments. It's not just judges, it's also prosecutors. It's not just prison guards, it's
police officers. It's this real robust effort that it's going to take to dismantle this thing.

